[中国新闻] 共军进行前所未有的军事大集结

五角大楼上月关于中国军事的报告注意到北京能力的规模扩张。
而且，在之前几年，政府内外的许多评论都集中在中国缺乏透明度的问题上。我们抱怨我们不知道中国到底在军事上花费多少，它到底要获得什么。最重要的是，我们抱怨我们不知道这些集结背后的战略性“为什么”。1 @& C* t/ X- e* e. ~, ]
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超过十五年以来，中国的国防开支持续增长。在最初几年，西方评论家以为中国的军事现代化计划是无关紧要的。最初他们认为中国只打算让陆军现代化，一旦完成陆军现代化，事情就会告一段落。然后他们认为即使中国继续集结，也要等数十年才能给美国或美国在该地区的同盟构成真正的问题。人在德国社区 a+ o' |" e% T F$ I9 P
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那么，当集结的步伐和范围继续超出许多中国观察家所预期的，论点就变成：中国有强劲的、日益增长的经济；它要用额外的资源建立现代化军事能力是自然的事情。

到了现在，随着中国增加数百架先进的战斗机；建造几十艘新潜艇、护卫舰和驱逐舰；现代化并扩张战略核武库；并安排数百枚新的短程导弹，论点就变成中国专心集结军事能力，并达到前所未有的水平，原因是它看到美国在二战以来花在军事上的开支比它多。

这个论点有一些真实性，但只有一些。事实上，中国军事集结真正开始于苏联解体后----而正在那时，中国无须担心其国防需要。而且在美国大幅度削减国防预算的时期，中国的集结还在继续。此外，亚洲任何其他国家的国防都没有以两位数增长。相反，台湾（它大概是中国主要的军事关切）在削减国防开支。而日本，唯一可能与中国竞争的地区“大国”，正经历十年经济停滞，国防预算也跟着停滞。
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当然，自从911以来，美国国防开支猛增。但中国人很清楚，大部分的增长都用于打阿富汗和伊拉克的战争。如果除掉战争国防追加拨款和人员成本增加的因素，美国的国防预算占国民生产总值的份额跟克林顿总统在任中期的差不多。而且如果布什的预算办公室可以随心所欲，那战争结束后国防开支将回到原来水平或更低。

显然，中国加大透明度将是有帮助的。但如果中国政治自由化方面没有重大转变，就没有理由期望奇迹发生。而且，在十五年的军事集结后，我们真的需要更大的透明度才能理解中国的目的吗？# q% q% C8 ?! \
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中国人是骄傲的人们，而且他们想被视为一个强大的、可能主导的国家。而且他们明白，强大不仅包括强大的经济，还包括强大的军事。当中国人看着当今的世界，多数时候是谁在挡路？那肯定不是欧洲人，他们的经济强大但几乎没有硬实力。那是美国。

部分美国汉学家倾向于认为中国的“和平发展”让它有别于之前的崛起势力，不会渴望权力和承认。然而中国人并不认为这两者是对立的。他们认为一个日益强大的经济是解决国内问题的关键，但他们也知道它是给军事现代化和扩张提供资源的关键。
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缺乏透明度是我们用来回避真正问题的把戏：中国的野心是成为尽可能强大的大国。美国此刻面对一大堆事情，我们不打算再加上一个中国，这可能是可以理解的。但这并不能改变这样一个事实：北京认为它拥有越多军力，它的那些野心也就越有可能实现。
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Gary J. Schmitt
Resident Scholar and Director of AEI's Program on Advanced Strategic Studies人在德国社区6 y/ w+ M V# W' T4 e' l( X

June 15, 2007

China's military aspirations

Last month's annual Pentagon report on the Chinese military took note of Beijing's sizable expansion of its capabilities -- as have all the reports since the Defense Department began producing them in 2000.
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And, as in previous years, much of the commentary inside and outside of the government has focused on China's lack of transparency.
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We complain that we don't know exactly how much China is spending on its military and what exactly it is acquiring. Most important, we complain that we don't know the strategic "why" behind this buildup.
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China's defense spending has been on the rise for more than 15 years. For the first few years, Western commentators dismissed its military modernization plans as insignificant. Initially they argued that the Chinese only wanted to modernize their forces for homeland defense, and once that was done we could expect a leveling-off. Then they argued that even if the Chinese continued their buildup, it would be decades before they presented a real problem to the United States or its allies in the region.

Then, when the pace and scope of the buildup continued beyond what most China watchers had expected, the argument was: China has a robust, growing economy; it's natural that it would use those additional resources to build a modern military capability.人在德国社区' j7 a5 t2 H! l! d, A: t

And now, as China adds hundreds of advanced fighters; builds scores of new submarines, frigates and destroyers; modernizes and expands its strategic nuclear arsenal; and fields hundreds of new theater-range missiles, the argument is that China is bent on building up its military capabilities to unprecedented levels because it sees the United States spending more on its military than it has since World War II.8 t! e# u7 C* x( K& e; z( R; X
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There is some truth in that point, but only some. The fact is that the Chinese military buildup really began after the demise of the Soviet Union -- that is, precisely when China had the least reason to worry about its defense needs. And the buildup continued during a period when the United States was cutting its own defense budget by significant amounts. Moreover, no other Asian regional power was putting forward double-digit defense increases. To the contrary, Taiwan -- presumably China's main military concern -- was slashing its defense budget. And Japan, the only possible regional "great power" competitor to China, was suffering from a decade of economic stagnation, with a static defense budget to match.

Of course, since Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. defense spending has skyrocketed. But the vast majority of that increase, as the Chinese well know, has gone toward fighting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

If one strips away the defense supplemental appropriations for the wars and factors in the jump in personnel costs, America's defense burden as a percentage of gross domestic product is about what it was during the middle of President Bill Clinton's time in office. And if the Bush budget office has its way, defense spending will return to those levels or lower after the wars end.) a; e9 P1 ]9 T& {4 _

To take but one example: Under current procurement and decommissioning plans, the U.S. Navy's attack submarine fleet will shrink to fewer than 30 boats by the late 2020s. China, meanwhile, has added more than 30 advanced submarines to its fleet over the past decade and has six new submarine programs underway.2 V! |. E% V/ F/ e! K6 t5 D

Obviously, greater transparency by the Chinese would be helpful.: T3 q/ @, {* r" \7 t2 N" ]7 f
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But absent a significant shift toward political liberalization in China, there's no reason to expect that to happen. And anyway, after a decade and a half of military buildup, do we really need greater transparency to understand what China is up to? The Chinese are a proud people and they want to be seen as a powerful, potentially dominant, state. And power, they understand, includes not only a strong economy but a powerful military. When the Chinese look at the world today, who gets in their way most of the time? It's certainly not the Europeans, who have economic strength but little hard power. It's the United States.

There is a tendency on the part of American Sinologists to think that China's "peaceful development" precludes it from craving what all rising powers before it have craved -- power and recognition. Yet the Chinese don't think the two are opposed at all. They view a growing economy as critical to solving their domestic problems, but they also know that it is critical to providing the resources for military modernization and expansion.

The lack of transparency is, if anything, a dodge we've used to avoid dealing with the real problem: China's ambitions to be as great a power as it can be. It's understandable, perhaps, that with all that is on America's plate at the moment, we're not inclined to add China.

But that doesn't change the fact that Beijing believes the more military power it has, the more likely it is that those ambitions will be fulfilled.

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