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当政府越来越重视贪腐问题时,这些本国的西方国家也可能因为政治风险而遭受惨痛损失。奥巴马政府正以宗教式的热情在执行《外国贪腐行为法》(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act),甚至不惜使用打击组织犯罪专用的技术。英国政府正考虑严格的反贿赂措施。一些自认有遵守泰国或印尼当地法规的高级主管,可能会蓦然发现他们已经触犯了自己国家的法律了。0 W+ a+ j6 P, [+ a4 S* m) F7 J
) E: G' V' u$ Q" N' K& B' `严肃的看待政治 , G1 c% |" R8 v* F1 n8 c' w V- F5 P! N; i# j2 @' D" ?& O
公司如何在此环境中生存呢?无简单的规则。新兴市场有非常不同的政治制度。在巴西,你需要了解国会的多党联盟;在中国,你需要通晓共产党权力的动态;在沙乌地阿拉伯,你需要了解领导的家庭内部关系。再加上地方的政治生态,情况就更复杂了。( l N9 A q. \# U0 p' a5 }+ E
7 `. @1 ^( w. r) s最重要是:要严肃的看待政治。石油及矿产公司一向如此。荷兰皇家壳牌石油公司(Royal Dutch Shell)尽管处在奈吉利亚这样一个危险易变的环境之下,却已经在奈国经营获利的生意超过50年。在新经济体中发展的公司往往比较天真。埃及的危机显示了他们无法避免被牵连于政治的战场中,即使这个战场现在透过网路开打。君不见,连谷歌的埃及主管戈宁(Wael Ghonim)也是一个政治活跃分子。 3 S& a' k% d+ |6 Q " C- K5 G( M [深入认清当地局势$ W, B' l! `: H; X7 Z" E1 A( s& B4 b
: v# k- X- K* K# o; u然而,所有这些技巧都有其致命的弱点。当重要的工厂倒闭之际,全球化的营运可能会让风险扩散,而不是隔离;拥抱地方政权可能使你成为仇恨的对象,就像壳牌石油在奈吉利亚遇到的一样;与你无法完全掌控制的当地人结盟,可能会被控以贪污的罪名。最后,只能说:“政治经济学”要比它的后代弟子“现代经济学”更复杂了。 5 S% n" m/ D+ b, e" A7 a1 _* L& t# f
Businesspeople need to think harder about political risk Feb 10th 2011 5 o2 ~! r ~: ^% t) D8 T8 `% x0 y, V& W: n0 l7 S! ?" O9 r9 M" H
A MONTH ago Ahmed Ezz was one of the most powerful businesspeople in Egypt. He controlled about 40% of the country’s steel production, played a leading role in the ruling party and, most important of all, was a bosom buddy of Hosni Mubarak’s son and heir apparent, Gamal. ! B, N8 J8 G" r6 w5 H / Y+ H# E3 d% W( mToday he is a has-been. Protesters have demonised him and torched his company headquarters. The old guard has dumped him as a liability. He is under investigation, his assets have been frozen and his right to travel has been restricted. Western companies that cultivated Mr Ezz wasted their time and money. 0 u8 J9 d0 e, v; @/ U / G/ J/ |% A. v* }It was once regarded as axiomatic that globalisation would marginalise politics. Theodore Levitt, one of Harvard Business School’s leading thinkers, argued that “the Earth is round but, for most purposes, it’s sensible to treat it as flat”. Kenichi Ohmae, a Japanese business guru, published “The Borderless World” and “The End of the Nation State”. Giant companies such as IBM and Ford played down the importance of country managers in their efforts to create globally integrated behemoths.1 @ P' i# t) R7 S; G, f) q
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The events in Egypt are a reminder of how foolish such “borderless” thinking can be. Dick Cheney once remarked, “The Good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas only where there are democratically elected regimes friendly to the United States.” It might be added that the Good Lord did not see fit to put economic growth in equally desirable places. The corporate world is rightly excited by the pell-mell growth in emerging markets, but these are rife with political risks—weak legal systems, makeshift institutions, volatile cities and fragile regimes.( j1 r; r5 { a' V! F0 N* \
. y0 @$ q3 c# {0 j4 FA growing number of countries, most notably China but also Russia and the Gulf states, are using business as an instrument of state power. And some of the world’s biggest companies, including most of the largest oil firms, are state-run, driven by political as much as economic considerations.; V: [& L$ {0 e( q {
v4 I* Y" w- ]3 ZChina is the leading offender, using state companies to snap up a growing share of the world’s natural resources. It is also using its state-industrial complex to pursue political goals. Google was forced to re-route its servers when it refused to censor e-mails. Four Rio Tinto executives were imprisoned in dubious circumstances. China is not alone: BP’s new partnership with Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil giant, to develop Russia’s Arctic region is complicated by murky political considerations. " Y u5 f5 z6 n" F! B- u. |' P 8 Y& |1 Y$ i" ~) g# nPolitical risks can also bite Western companies at home, where governments are increasingly vigilant about corruption. The Obama administration is enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with an evangelical zeal—and employing techniques once reserved for fighting organised crime. The British government is introducing tough anti-bribery measures. Executives who adopt what they regard as “local” rules in Thailand or Indonesia can find themselves facing prison sentences back home. # _/ a0 F, g/ M1 a: l% b & K3 X, N, t7 o# ^3 rHow do companies cope? There are no simple rules. Countries that are cavalierly lumped together as emerging markets have very different political regimes. In Brazil you need to understand Congress’s multi-party alliances; in China the power dynamics of the Communist Party; in Saudi Arabia the internal relations of the ruling family. Local politics add yet more complexity.- y: p# O. A7 Z9 V9 k/ Y
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The most important advice is to take politics seriously. Oil and mining companies have always done this. Royal Dutch Shell has run a profitable business in Nigeria for more than 50 years despite a dangerous and volatile environment. “New economy” companies have tended to be much more naive. The Egyptian crisis demonstrates that they cannot avoid being caught up in political battles which are now fought over the internet. A Google executive in the region, Wael Ghonim, also doubled as a leading political activist. 8 T7 @5 x: I/ @* M- A. f4 H9 i- W2 _# T# w) x) R
A bit of help " W1 _0 A1 U" t& L6 x7 z% o8 w: |3 s; N9 { ~/ _: G4 \; u7 d
Companies can buy advice from political-risk consultancies such as Control Risks, a British outfit, or Eurasia Group, an American one, or various niche consultancies set up by political bigwigs, from Henry Kissinger on down, and ex-ambassadors. (Full disclosure: the Economist Intelligence Unit, a sister organisation of The Economist, also offers advice on political risk.) Ian Bremmer, the president of Eurasia Group and a rising guru in the area, has written some provocative books on the subject.4 `& `1 K$ V2 p9 w
$ t& \( v6 [, p7 z6 _ v2 IBut companies need to go further than just buying advice. They need to put more emphasis on local knowledge: many globalisation-obsessed companies may come to regret the fashion for downgrading country managers. They also need to be less impressed by the appearance of stability. The rapid collapse of Egypt’s autocracy should be food for thought for companies that have bet big on China (with its appearance of order) rather than India (with its messy democracy). . s K- M7 [" j2 w7 s. m8 J3 m , i$ M: o! O! {/ y3 }) USome techniques have proved particularly successful. One is diversifying operations. Chrysler escaped a wave of nationalisation in Peru because its local factory manufactured only half the components needed to assemble a car. Another is putting down deep local roots. Over the years Shell has trained and employed many of the people who regulate Nigeria’s oil industry. A third is sharing risks. A growing number of companies form complex alliances with other firms, NGOs and government bodies. + Y1 I4 g! Z7 l+ x+ w4 g, U/ ]1 c% e/ c6 a: E
Yet all these techniques come with a sting in the tail. Creating global operations may spread risks rather than isolating them when a vital factory is closed. Cuddling up to the local regime may turn you into an object of hatred, as Shell has discovered in Nigeria. Weaving alliances with local people you cannot fully control may expose you to charges of corruption. It turns out that political economy is a much more complicated subject than its trendy modern offspring, economics. 7 a- X' z. h( i4 ]7 e6 d+ \+ \7 ], K- h5 O- z; }
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