随着有关伊拉克战争的讨论逐渐深入，它越来越类似上世纪90年代有关南斯拉夫问题的讨论。美国人再次听到有关这样的讨论：疯狂的外国人被古老的种族仇恨所困，美国完全没有必要卷入他们的内斗。令人感到滑稽的是，那些如今作此惊人之举的现实主义者15年前的南斯拉夫问题上还是抵制这一伪造逻辑的。当时，他们逃避现实是可以理解的，因为如果他们屈服于今天的“不干涉”政策，那将是灾难性地失误。 ( `0 M2 ~# @& Q' k3 X' @5 C0 q" B
在前南斯拉夫，与现在的伊拉克几乎相同，种族之间的冲突当时已经爆发了好些年，但是他们也在很长时间内成功实现的和平共存。克罗地亚人、波斯尼亚人、斯洛文尼亚人、科索沃人、马其顿人、塞尔维亚人在相对温和的土耳其王国和随后自己的君主制度统治下和平相处了几百年；而伊拉克的库尔德人、什叶派和逊尼派人也在极权统治下和平相处了好几百年。 # M' Q* n% z/ O7 r1 L0 P% W: F" A/ l+ j0 A6 }: G9 m
美国入侵这两个国家之前，种族之间的联姻率非常高，民间没有叫嚣内战的呼声。到了当代，国内冲突也是由一些战争狂人挑起的，他们要从冲突中渔翁得利。这些战争狂人之所以能占得先机，是因为这两个国家都经历了类似的“中央集权”坍塌。在法理得不到伸张的国土上，普通百姓便被迫从一些宗派民兵组织那里寻求保护。随着这些宗派组织之间的暴力暴行不断升级，他们便要求复仇，最终导致了死亡循环。 3 t- |5 V" R$ F+ M& k 1 P) z* W: V& a; w: p( [ 坐在舒适的睡椅上读有关的暴力冲突报道，人很容易就得出这个结论：这些人都疯了，我们救不了他们。但是想想，如果1992年洛杉矶暴力冲突持续发展几周，警察和军队不予干涉，洛杉矶会成为什么样子？洛杉矶完全可能类似现在的巴格达、萨拉热窝，各种不同种族的美国人之间互相仇杀，情势一片混乱。 , e. I( m5 @+ {# u! u7 m3 Z0 ^+ a # s2 j) p" [$ A2 E8 v2 S7 {" t( x 暴力可能很快就会席卷整个加州南部。这也正是巴尔干半岛暴力延伸从斯洛文尼亚延伸到克罗地亚、波斯尼亚和科索沃的过程。如果没有美国领导下的干涉，巴尔干半岛可能陷入一个更加可怕的暴力恶性循环。 9 M) N/ t& ?9 D. j$ ?" G5 B0 ?% L- a" \# p4 K U% O
今天，只有美国驻兵才能阻止已经处于低阶段内战的伊拉克不会沦为类似南斯拉夫的全面内战状态。' g$ o% Y: E' @1 [. G8 O4 \
7 z: ~2 R* d/ u6 U7 [$ J' C' BIs Iraq turning into Yugoslavia? ( |5 D, Q0 q" \! {The lessons learned from the Balkans in the 1990s call for more troops in Iraq, not a withdrawal. ( X- ]; H d% g, n! ^2 ^& jFebruary 21, 20078 n! I4 v4 _9 g$ t8 d* w
/ {7 {- N' G, Z- w/ lTHE IRAQ DEBATE is starting to resemble the Yugoslavia debate of the early 1990s. Once again we are hearing that crazed foreigners are in the grip of ancient ethnic hatreds and that the U.S. has no cause to get involved in their internecine strife. Ironically, some of those now making this "realist" argument resisted its spurious logic 15 years ago. They were right to do so then, and they would be tragically mistaken were they to succumb to the siren song of nonintervention today. 6 ?% _# T# p% h+ N ! P8 \/ E, x" j0 ?In the former Yugoslavia, as in Iraq, ethnic groups have clashed over the years, but they also have had long periods of peaceful coexistence — and not only under the heavy hand of a Tito or Saddam Hussein. Croats, Bosnians, Slovenians, Kosovars, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Serbs lived together for centuries under the relatively benign Ottoman and Habsburg empires and later under their own monarchy. So did Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis in Mesopotamia. + N0 G1 ?* I9 T$ ^3 m( U / e( G1 W9 |2 O7 O+ @3 A7 p* \In both cases, intermarriage rates were high, and there was no popular clamor for civil war. In more recent times, domestic strife was fomented by megalomaniacs such as Slobodan Milosevic and Abu Musab Zarqawi, who sought to profit from the violence. They were able to gain the upper hand because central authority had collapsed. In a lawless land, ordinary people were forced to seek protection from sectarian militias. As these groups committed atrocities, they fed demands for vengeance, leading to a death spiral. ' H D1 I9 q; n: R$ E. e* r4 E6 Z , }4 @+ P6 g, Y7 ^Viewing the violence from a comfy couch, it is easy to conclude that "these people are animals. We can't help them." But imagine what would have happened in Los Angeles if the 1992 riots had gone on for weeks, with no police or military intervention. L.A. could have come to resemble Baghdad or Sarajevo, with Anglo, African American, Latino and Asian gangs rampaging out of control. 4 E! g; H! W! j8 c0 e8 r9 }# ?( A
To extend the analogy, violence could have spread throughout Southern California. That's what happened in the Balkans when fighting spread from Slovenia, the first province to secede, to Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. A wider spillover was averted thanks to American-led intervention. / c1 T, |& k! h9 A2 h+ S/ t8 ~) R+ u5 X7 U, ?
Today, only the U.S. troop presence is preventing Iraq, already in the throes of a low-level civil war, from degenerating into an all-out conflict a la Yugoslavia. The likely effect of such a bloodletting is spelled out in a recent report, "Things Fall Apart," by Brookings Institution fellows Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack. They examined recent civil wars not only in Yugoslavia but in Afghanistan, Congo, Lebanon, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somalia and Tajikistan. "We found," they write, "that 'spillover' is common in massive civil wars" and "that while its intensity can vary considerably, at its worst it can have truly catastrophic effects."0 {& U. t7 L2 n7 G& Z0 _
6 h% h9 u# _5 H2 r8 ~' ^They cite six such effects, beyond the obvious humanitarian nightmare. . ?* C7 |6 ^! o: H5 k! I8 `/ I' {, a" D% ~5 a8 J0 l1 T
First, a massive exodus of refugees, "large groupings of embittered people who serve as a ready recruiting pool for armed groups still waging the civil war." For example, Palestinian refugees sparked conflicts in Jordan in 1970-71 and in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. 6 O3 ^' ^( j# `# _8 U- A7 r% Z5 } 5 C% k. b$ J/ C( e W7 tSecond, states in civil war can provide a haven for existing terrorist groups (Al Qaeda in Afghanistan) or create new ones (Hezbollah in Lebanon). 1 F; O1 ]* ~- I) e+ X7 h/ p0 L" |
Third, civil wars often radicalize neighboring populations. For instance, the Rwanda genocide in the mid-1990s sparked a civil war in Congo, which has led to an estimated 4 million deaths. 8 m9 L7 D/ K( j& B; Z3 H4 M( @+ B% C1 l2 U
Fourth, "secession breeds secessionism," as in Yugoslavia.& D* `7 o9 |! l% H, H
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Fifth, there are huge economic losses. / z$ L/ {" G1 ~4 W8 p- W
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Finally, Byman and Pollack write, "the problems created by these other forms of spillover often provoke neighboring states to intervene — to stop terrorism as Israel tried repeatedly in Lebanon, to halt the flow of refugees as the Europeans tried in Yugoslavia, or to end (or respond to) the radicalization of their own population as Syria did in Lebanon…. The result is that many civil wars become regional wars." 4 ~/ {* P! `' k( p/ j3 O& u' c* y/ o/ ]8 f' ]! y7 e
As Byman and Pollack note, "Iraq has all the earmarks of creating quite severe spillover problems." This is, after all, a state with something worth fighting for (oil), and one where all the major combatants (various Sunni, Shiite and Kurd groups) are amply represented in neighboring countries. Iraq's potential as a breeding ground for terrorism is even greater than Lebanon's or Afghanistan's. : w+ Z0 I+ V v% S4 D, B8 V9 {# \: e6 L& v8 y" q( F
Maybe it's too late to avoid the catastrophe that Byman and Pollack warn of. But Yugoslavia showed how much good a decisive intervention could do. The case for action — for sending more troops rather than withdrawing the ones already there — is even stronger in Iraq because we have caused its current turmoil and cannot escape its consequences.
